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Abstract
The notion of fiscal aid is becoming crucial in determining the relationship between 
supra-national integration and national tax sovereignty; the selectivity criterion is 
often key in the assessment of compatibility of fiscal measures with Article 107(1) 
TFEU. Therefore, the notion of selectivity as defined by the recent case-law of the 
CJEU and decision-making practice of the Commission is fundamental in order 
to understand the actual allocation of powers in direct taxation matters. Against 
this backdrop, the aim of the present article is to establish what the current notion 
of selectivity is in fiscal aids, assessing whether the approach used by the CJEU 
and the Commission share common patterns, and evaluating the impact of such 
interpretation on the division of competences within the EU. In particular, this 
article offers a critical reading of the recent European Commission v. World Duty 
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Résumé
La notion d’aide fiscal est en train de devenir cruciale dans la détermination des 
relations entre l’intégration supranationale et la souveraineté fiscale nationale. Le 
critère de la sélectivité joue souvent un rôle fondamental dans la détermination de 
la compatibilité des mesures fiscales avec l’article 107 (1) TFUE. Par conséquent, 
la notion de sélectivité, comme déterminée par la récent jurisprudence de la CJUE 
et la pratique décisionnel de la Commission, est fondamentale pour comprendre 
la répartition des pouvoirs en matière de taxation directe. Dans ce contexte, le but 
du présent article est d’établir quelle est la notion actuelle de sélectivité dans les 
aides fiscale, en évaluant si les approches utilisées par la CJUE et la Commission 
partagent un modèle commun et l’impact de cette interprétation sur la répartition 
des compétences au sein de l’UE. En particulier, cet article offre une lecture 
critique du récent arrêt Commission européenne c. World Duty Free et des soi-
disant «Tax Rulings».
Key words: State aid; fiscal aid; selectivity, Spanish Goodwill; tax rulings; allocation 
of powers; tax harmonization
JEL: K21
I. Introduction
Article 107(1) TFEU lays down the requirements that qualify a State 
intervention in the economy as an aid incompatible with the internal market, 
which is therefore forbidden. In particular, it provides that ‘any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market’. The notion of State 
aid mostly derives from the interpretation of these criteria, as elaborated by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter; CJEU).1 By analysing 
the CJEU case-law, it is self-evident that these requirements have a different 
impact on State aid assessment, even though they are cumulative criteria that 
formally have the same importance on the evaluation (Boccaccio, 2016).
In determining the compatibility of a tax measure with State aid rules, 
selectivity is often the crucial element, since other conditions laid down in 
1 For an overview of settled case-law on State aid, see European Commission, Commission 
Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, p. 1–50.
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Article 107(1) TFEU are almost always satisfied (Bartosch, 2009; Lovdahl 
Gormsen, 2016). The notion of selectivity was developed by the CJEU and the 
Commission mostly in cases where the measure at stake was a fiscal benefit, 
also because of the importance of the requirement in this context.
Moreover, fiscal aids ‘lie on the boundary of the division of competence’ 
between the EU and its Member States (Nicolaides, 2007). Therefore, the 
selectivity criterion plays a pivotal role in this division of powers in direct 
taxation matters, since it draws a red line between what is left to the discretion 
of the Member States and what is covered, instead, by the notion of State 
aid subjected the control of the Commission. On this ground, the notion of 
selectivity in fiscal aids as defined by the most recent CJEU case-law and 
Commission decision-making practice is key in determining the extent of 
the EU Institutions’ ‘interference’ with the national fiscal sovereignty of the 
Member States.
In the light of the above, the aim of the present article is to establish what 
the current notion of selectivity for the purpose of Article 107(1) TFUE is 
in relation to tax measures; assessing whether the approaches used by the 
CJEU and the Commission share a common pattern; and if they could truly 
impinge upon the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States. Therefore, section 
II purports to define the concept of selectivity in fiscal aids, section III and IV 
focus on recent developments in the CJEU case-law and Commission decision-
making practice respectively, with specific reference to the World Duty Free 
judgment and the Commission decisions on tax rulings. Lastly, in section V, 
some conclusions will be drawn from the framework provided.
II. Selectivity in fiscal aids: the background
The extension of the notion of selectivity takes a decisive role in determining 
the scope of the application of Article 107(1) TFEU with regard to fiscal 
measures. The notion has been mostly shaped by the CJEU, which contributed 
to the development of the concept of selectivity by identifying its constitutive 
elements. Moving from the assumption that the evaluation of selectivity should 
be made on the grounds of the practical effects produced by the measure, 
without taking into account its formal structure,2 the CJEU identified two 
types of selectivity: geographical (or regional or territorial) and material 
selectivity.
2 Court of Justice, Judgment of 2 July 1974, Case C-173-73, Italian Republic v Commission 
of the European Communities, para. 13.
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Geographical selectivity concerns measures that grant more favourable 
treatment to undertakings of a specific part of the national territory compared 
to others. The turning point in the CJEU case-law on regional selectivity 
occurred with the judgment on the Azores case3 (Moreno González, 2017). 
In this judgment, the Court of Justice considered the extent to which the low 
tax regime applied to the Autonomous Region of the Azores, and adopted by 
an infra-State body, constituted a selective measure compared to the general 
Portuguese tax system. The Court of Justice stated that for the assessment of 
the selectivity of a measure, there must be an examination of whether the infra-
State body detained a sufficiently autonomous power (institutional, procedural 
and financial) with respect to the central authority, detailing the criteria that 
shall be used for this evaluation, and whether the measure actually applies 
to all undertakings of the territory under the infra-State body’s competence 
(Stuart, 2017; Lindsay-Poulsen, 2008; Bousin and Piernas, 2008; Da Cruz 
Vilaca, 2009). This approach towards regional selectivity was confirmed and 
specified in the subsequent case-law of the CJEU, such as the UGT Rioja 
case4, which discussed the compatibility of a fiscal scheme approved by the 
Historical Territories of the Basque Country that entailed a lower tax rate 
compared to the rest of Spain.
The legal framework seems less certain with regard to material selectivity 
where the case-law is more casuistic (Moreno González, 2017; Pérez-Bernabeu, 
2017). Material selectivity affects measures that are aimed at granting an 
advantage to a limited number of beneficiaries on the ground of discriminatory 
criteria. The assessment of selectivity relies on the well-known, three-step 
analysis5 developed by the CJEU. Over the years, the analysis has been refined 
and clarified, but it still involves a certain degree of uncertainty due to some 
interpretative difficulties and the discrepancy between the case-law of the 
CJEU and the Commission practise (Pérez-Bernabeu, 2017). The three-step 
analysis, or ‘derogation test’, consists of the following stages. First, it is necessary 
to identify the ‘the common or normal regime under the tax system applicable 
in the geographical area constituting the relevant reference framework.’6 Since 
fiscal aids can be considered as a relief from a burden (instead of a positive 
benefit), it is extremely important to identify the reference framework that 
3 Court of Justice, Judgment of 6 September 2006, Case C-88/03, Portuguese Republic 
v Commission of the European Communities.
4 Court of Justice, Judgment of 11 September 2008, Joined cases C-428/06 and C-434/06, 
Unión General de Trabajadores de La Rioja (UGT-Rioja) and Others v Juntas Generales del 
Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya and Others.
5 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid, cit., para. 126–128.
6 General Court, Judgment of 18 December 2008. Cases T-211/04 and T-215/04 Government 
of Gibraltar (T-211/04) and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (T-215/04) 
v Commission of the European Communities, para. 143.
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makes it possible to compare the contested measure with normal tax, or the 
tax that would have otherwise been paid by the beneficiary (Nicolaides, 2015; 
Arena, 2017c). The second step of the assessment concerns the comparison of 
the measure with the benchmark established in the prior stage of the analysis, 
as well as demonstrating that the measure derogates from that common regime 
by imposing a different treatment for economic operators that, in light of the 
objective assigned to the tax system of the Member State concerned, are in 
a comparable factual and legal situation.7 Third, even if it is selective, the 
measure can nonetheless be considered as being compatible with the internal 
market. Indeed, this stage calls for an inquiry into whether the measure is 
justified by the nature or the general scheme of the system and is thus ‘not 
selective in nature even though it gives an advantage to the undertakings which 
are able to benefit from it.’8
The so-called de facto selectivity constitutes a peculiar type of material 
selectivity. De facto selectivity characterizes measures that, despite being 
formally general, have selective effects. The CJEU first elaborated this notion 
in the Gibraltar case9, where the contested measure was a corporate tax reform 
that involved: company registration fee, payroll tax and business property 
occupation tax (the BPOT). Moreover, according to the so-called profit cap, 
undertakings had to pay due taxes only when achieving the minimum threshold 
of profits fixed at 15%. The CJEU considered the corporate tax system in itself 
to be de facto selective, since it was designed to give preferential treatment 
to the group of the beneficiary undertakings that, because of their nature, 
fulfilled the requirements (Aalbers, 2017). Hence, with the Gibraltar judgment, 
the Court of Justice definitely established the principle of the effect of the 
measure as the cornerstone of state aid assessments.
III.  The CJEU case-law: the extension of the notion of selectivity
and of limitations on Member States’ sovereignty
The selectivity requirement has been defined by the CJEU mostly in a series 
of cases concerning tax measures. The notion has an inherently fluid character, 
since it needs to adapt to new scenarios.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem, para. 144.
9 Court of Justice, Judgment of 15 November 2011, Joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, 
European Commission (C-106/09 P) and Kingdom of Spain (C-107/09 P) v Government of 
Gibraltar and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
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Against this backdrop, the recent judgment in European Commission 
v. World Duty Free10 focused on the notion of selectivity and trying to establish 
its boundaries. The case fell under the scrutiny of the Court of Justice after 
the appeal of the Autogrill11 and Banco Santander12 judgment, decided by the 
General Court and subsequently joined. The measure brought to the attention 
of the General Court in Autogrill and Banco Santander was a Spanish provision 
that allowed undertakings taxable in Spain – in this case Banco Santander 
SA, Santusa Holding SL and Autogrill España – to deduct, in the form of 
an amortisation, the goodwill resulting from the acquisition of shareholdings 
in foreign companies from the basis of assessment for the corporate tax for 
which the undertaking is liable.13 These shareholdings had to reach at least 
5% and they had to be held without interruption for at least one year.14 The 
Commission qualified the measure as State aid due to the fact that it was 
applicable exclusively to undertakings respecting the criteria provided (in 
particular, the acquisition of shareholdings in Spanish companies was not 
covered by this benefit).
The General Court annulled the decision of the Commission because 
of the lack of an evaluation of a specific element, namely the ex ante 
identification of a ‘category of undertakings which are exclusively favoured 
by the measure at issue’.15 Indeed, the General Court tried to introduce this 
new assessment in the original three-steps analysis, focusing on the evaluation 
of the discriminatory nature of the measure (Jaeger, 2015) and considering 
that ‘for the condition of selectivity to be satisfied […] the mere finding that 
a derogation from the common or ‘normal’ tax regime has been provided for 
cannot give rise to selectivity’.16 In other words, the reasoning adopted by the 
General Court was that if a measure derogates from the reference framework 
but is open to all undertakings, it is not possible to compare the situation of 
the beneficiaries and those who are excluded by the field of the application 
of the measure (Staviczky, 2015). Moreover, the mere application of specific 
conditions for the granting of the measure – albeit unusual or difficult to 
be met by undertakings – does not mean that the selectivity requirement is 
fulfilled (Temple Lang, 2015). In general, scholars considered this approach 
10 Court of Justice, Judgment of 21 December 2016, Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P, 
European Commission v World Duty Free Group SA and Others.
11 General Court, Judgment of 7 November 2014, Case T-219/10, Autogrill España, SA 
v European Commission.
12 General Court, Judgment of 7 November 2014, Case T-399/11, Banco Santander, SA and 
Santusa Holding, SL v European Commission.
13 Ibidem, para. 14.
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem. para. 49.
16 Ibidem.
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to be an improvement since it made it possible to overcome the formalistic 
distinction between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of an aid (Nicolaides, 
2015). Furthermore, the judgments seemed to be a good starting point for the 
CJEU to clarify the controversial notion of selectivity in fiscal aids, also with 
reference to the so-called selective advantage, by addressing, in particular, the 
tendency to combine the analysis of the selectivity and economic advantage 
criteria (Girau and Petit, 2015; Jaeger, 2015).
The cases were joined and submitted to the decision of the Court of Justice 
that, in accordance with AG Wathelet’s Opinion,17 subverted the judgments 
of the General Court, which ruled the measure to be State aid. In particular, 
AG Wathelet stressed the excessively formalistic and restrictive approach of 
the General Court in seeking to identify a particular category of undertakings 
exclusively favoured by the measure, instead of giving room to the essential 
question, namely whether that measure differentiates between undertakings 
which are in a comparable situation.18 Moreover, the AG pointed out that 
‘the fact that the conditions imposed by the measure at issue were not very 
strict and the benefits which that measure conferred were therefore available 
to many undertakings does not call into question its selective nature but only 
its degree of selectivity’.19
The most interesting aspect of the World Duty Free judgment lies in the 
analysis of the selectivity requirement made in the light of the Gibraltar ruling, 
giving therefore a kind of ‘authentic interpretation’ of the latter. In particular, 
the Court of Justice stated that the introduction of a further assessment in 
the selectivity test – namely the ex ante identification of a specific category of 
undertakings – is not in line with settled case-law,20 specifying further that it 
is not possible to derive this principle from the Gibraltar case. The Court of 
Justice pointed out that, as stated in Gibraltar, ‘the selectivity of a tax measure 
can be established even if that measure does not constitute a derogation from 
an ordinary tax system, but is an integral part of that system’21 (that is, the 
so-called de facto selectivity) and it does not entail the ex ante identification 
of a specific category of undertakings since it is already consistent with settled 
case-law of the CJEU to the effect that ‘it is sufficient, in order to establish 
the selectivity of a measure that derogates from an ordinary tax system, to 
demonstrate that that measure benefits certain operators and not others, 
17 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 28 July 2016, Joined cases C-20/15 
P and C-21/15 P, European Commission v World Duty Free Group SA and Others.
18 Ibidem, para. 85.
19 Ibidem, para. 88.
20 World Duty Free, cit. para. 71.
21 Ibidem, para. 76.
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although all those operators are in an objectively comparable situation in the 
light of the objective pursued by the ordinary tax system.’22
In sum, World Duty Free ends up extending the notion of selectivity, by 
narrowly construing Autogrill and Banco Santander where the General Court 
tried to move the evaluation of selectivity to ex ante instead of ex post. By 
contrast, in World Duty Free, the Court of Justice seems to consider selective 
measures as those that derogate from the reference framework and that entail 
a different treatment, regardless of the potential accessibility of the measure. 
According to some commentators, this approach could lead to a major 
extension of the notion of selectivity, which could have the effect of increasing 
the capacity of the Commission to interfere with national fiscal choices 
(Derenne, 2017). Moreover, this approach arguably turns the selectivity test 
into an irrelevant evaluation by shifting the focus of the assessment exclusively 
on the economic advantage granted by the measure.
IV.  The Commission decision-making practice: the notion of selective 
advantage and the identification of the reference framework
Recent Commission decision-making practice had to face the issue of 
defining the selectivity requirement in dealing with tax rulings. Indeed, since 
2013, the Commission has been investigating the tax ruling practice of Member 
States by setting up a dedicated Task Force Tax Planning Practices, in order 
to fight the so-called BEPS (base erosion and profit shifting). In December 
2014, this inquiry was extended to all Member States and resulted in several 
decisions to initiate formal investigations. Until now, the Commission adopted 
five negative final decisions involving Luxembourg,23 Ireland,24 Belgium,25 the 
Netherlands26, and there are still four formal investigations ongoing involving 
22 Ibidem.
23 European Commission. Decision (EU) 2016/2326 of 21 October 2015 on State aid 
SA.38375 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) which Luxembourg granted to Fiat in JOCE L/351/2016 and 
European Commission. Decision (EU) of 04.10.2017 on state aid SA.38944 (2014/C) (ex 2014/
NN) implemented by Luxembourg to Amazon, not published yet.
24 European Commission. Decision (EU) 2017/1283 of 30 August 2016 on State aid SA.38373 
(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple in JOCE L/187/2017.
25 European Commission. Decision (EU) 2016/1699 of 11 January 2016 on the excess profit 
exemption State aid scheme SA.37667 (2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) implemented by Belgium in 
JOCE L/260/2016.
26 European Commission. Decision (EU) 2017/502 of 21 October 2015 on State aid SA.38374 
(2014/C ex 2014/NN) implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks in JOCE C/460/2014.
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the Netherlands,27 Luxembourg28 and the UK.29 The Commission ordered the 
recovery of the contested aids mostly on the ground of the conclusion that 
the advanced pricing agreements at stake, being at odd with the arm’s length 
principle, were selective. The decisions are currently under the scrutiny of the 
General Court, after challenges brought by both the Member States and the 
taxpayers involved.30
In order to have a better understanding of the issue of selectivity in relation 
to the aforementioned Commission decisions, it is necessary to briefly examine 
the tax ruling instrument as used by the Member States. Since the Treaties 
do not confer competences onto the EU in the field of direct taxation, 
Member States retain the power to design their tax system, albeit every fiscal 
measure must comply with EU law and, in particular, with its State aid rules.31 
Therefore, Member States can adopt tax rulings, which are binding decisions 
issued by their tax authorities, at taxpayers’ request, in order to find out 
how applicable domestic tax provisions will be applied to a specific case. Tax 
rulings are instruments of unarguable importance in providing legal certainty 
to undertakings;32 they help them foresee future costs that they will have to 
bear because of taxation of a certain situation or transaction.
A peculiar type of tax ruling is known as Advance Pricing Agreement 
(hereinafter; APA), which is an ‘arrangement that determines, in advance of 
controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables 
and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) 
for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed 
27 European Commission, Decision of 18 December 2017 on alleged State aid SA.46470 
(2017/NN in favour of Inter IKEA, not published yet.
28 European Commission, Decision of 3 December 2015 on alleged State aid SA.38945 
(2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) in favour of McDonald’s in JOCE C/258/2016 and European 
Commission, Decision of 19 September 2016 on alleged State aid SA.44888 (2016/NN) (ex 
2016/EO) in favour of GDF Suez in C/36/2017.
29 European Commission, Decision of 26 October 2017 on alleged State aid SA.44896 
(2017/C) (ex 2017/NN) regarding the UK tax scheme for multinationals (Controlled Foreign 
Company rules) in JOCE C/400/2017.
30 For a list of cases related to tax ruling decisions, see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
state_aid/tax_rulings/index_en.htmln (last accessed: 14 April 2018).
31 See Court of Justice, Judgment of 22 June 2006, Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03, Kingdom 
of Belgium (C-182/03) and Forum 187 ASBL (C-217/03) v Commission of the European 
Communities, par. 81;Court of Justice, Judgment of 29 March 2012, Case C-417/10, Ministero 
dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle Entrate v 3M Italia SpA, para. 25.
32 European Commission, DG Competition, Internal Working Paper – Background to the 
High Level Forum on State Aid of 3 June 2016 (‘Working Paper on State Aid and Tax Rulings’), 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/working_paper_tax_rulings.
pdf (last accessed 14 April 2018), para. 5.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
122  GABRIELLA PEROTTO
period of time’.33 Unlike transactions between non-integrated companies 
(that is, companies which are not part of a group) that are assumed to be 
conducted under market conditions, intra-group transactions may be at 
odds with market terms, as they are estimated by the corporate group itself. 
Therefore, this system can lead to the manipulation of profit allocation in 
order to shift revenues to low tax countries. In order to avoid such a distortion, 
the OECD has formulated the so-called ‘arm’s length principle’, which can be 
applied by means of five reliable methods that make it possible to calculate 
the correct transfer pricing for intra-group transactions.34 The selection of the 
method is often ambiguous and complicated and it can lead to very different 
outcomes. Although the source of the arm’s length principle is non-binding,35 
it is considered to be a globally recognized standard (Iliopoulos, 2017; Joris 
and De Cock, 2017).
APAs are considered practices that enhance taxation transparency and 
predictability as well as prevent double taxation. Therefore, they are not 
per se incompatible State aids, as long as they do not confer a selective 
economic advantage. The mere fact that the advantage granted derives from 
an agreement, and therefore a negotiation, between a company and the tax 
authorities of a Member State does not imply the selectivity of the measure. 
Indeed, it is necessary to prove that the tax ruling was issued on the ground of 
non-objective or custom-made criteria36 (Iliopoulos, 2017). In order to make 
this evaluation, the Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid37 and 
the Working Paper on State Aid and Tax Ruling both recall the arm’s length 
principle as allegedly endorsed by the Court of Justice in the case Forum 187,38 
where it was used to determine whether a fiscal measure prescribing a method 
for an integrated group company to determine its taxable profit gives rise to 
a selective advantage for the purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU.39
33 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on the work of the EU Joint Transfer 
Pricing Forum in the field of dispute avoidance and resolution procedures and on Guidelines for 
Advance Pricing Agreements within the EU, COM/2007/0071 final, p. 9.
34 OECD, transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
22 July 2010, available at: http://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-
multinational-enterprises-and-tax-administrations-20769717.htm (last accessed 14 April 2018).
35 The arm’s length principle is defined in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
and it is further elaborated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
36 Court of Justice, Judgment of 4 June 2015, Case C-15/14 P, European Commission v MOL 
Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt.
37 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid, cit., par. 172.
38 Kingdom of Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v. Commission, cit.
39 Working Paper on State Aid and Tax Rulings, cit., para. 4.
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The introduction of the arm’s length principle in the evaluation of the 
selective advantage of fiscal measures gave rise to a number of criticisms. At 
first, it is necessary to remark that the Forum 187 judgment does not make an 
explicit reference to the arm’s length principle. Instead, the Court of Justice 
merely affirmed that in order to assess whether a fiscal scheme (in this case 
a Belgian tax regime for authorized coordination centers) was to be considered 
a derogation from the reference framework granting an economic advantage, 
it had to be compared with ‘the ordinary tax system, based on the difference 
between profits and outgoings of an undertaking carrying on its activities in 
conditions of free competition’40 (Joris and De Cock, 2017). Therefore, it has 
been noted that it is not straightforward to consider the arm’s length principle 
as an implied corollary of the evaluation ex Article 107 TFEU ‘independently 
of whether a Member State has incorporated this principle into its national 
legal system’41 solely on the ground of the reference made in the Forum 187 
judgment to the ‘conditions of free competition’. Indeed, it is not possible 
to derive from that statement the notion of the arm’s length principle, such 
as the one adopted by the Commission (Gormsen, 2016; Joris and De Cock, 
2017; Kyriazis, 2016).
Another controversial issue is the fact that the introduction of such a vague 
concept could lead to legal uncertainty for companies, which is exactly the 
opposite of what APAs try to reach. Indeed, as seen above, the calculation of 
the correct transfer pricing according to the arm’s length principle is a hard 
task since it depends on several factors. This exercise consists of assessing 
something that is purely formal since transfer prices are, because of their 
nature, exempt from market influences (Giraud and Petit, 2017).
Moreover, the arm’s length principle is used for the identification of both 
the requirements of economic advantage as well as selectivity, merging them 
into the so-called ‘selective advantage’ test. More specifically, the Commission 
considers that if APAs lead to an unjustified reduction of the tax liability 
a companies; such a ‘reduction constitutes both the advantage granted by 
the tax measure and the derogation from the system of reference’.42 On this 
matter, in the Commission v. MOL case,43 the CJEU has recently highlighted 
the autonomy of the selectivity criterion stating that ‘the requirement as to 
selectivity under Article 107(1) TFEU must be clearly distinguished from 
the concomitant detection of an economic advantage, in that, where the 
Commission has identified an advantage, understood in a broad sense, as 
40 Kingdom of Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v. Commission, cit., para. 95.
41 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid, cit., para. 172.
42 See Decision on State aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, cit., par. 253 
and Decision on State aid which Luxembourg granted to Fiat, cit., para. 217.
43 European Commission v MOL, cit.
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arising directly or indirectly from a particular measure, it is also required to 
establish that that advantage specifically benefits one or more undertakings’.44 
Nevertheless, in the subsequent paragraph, the Court of Justice specified that 
‘the selectivity requirement differs depending on whether the measure in 
question is envisaged as a general scheme of aid or as individual aid. In the latter 
case, the identification of the economic advantage is, in principle, sufficient 
to support the presumption that it is selective’.45 However, it should be noted 
that this judgment does not entail the conflation of the two requirements; it 
merely establishes that, for individual aids, there is a rebuttable presumption 
of fulfillment of the selectivity requirement when the economic advantage is 
already assessed (Arena, 2017a; Kyriazis, 2016). Indeed, even if they share 
some similarities, these two requirements have a different function: whereas 
the economic advantage test requires a comparison between the advantage 
deriving from the measure and market terms, the selectivity test involves 
a comparison between the beneficiary’s treatment and the treatment of other 
undertakings in a similar legal and factual situation (Joris and De Cock, 2017). 
Some scholars argued that the Commission approach toward this presumption 
could lead to a ‘potentially dangerous development in EU State aid law’ 
under many perspectives. First, economic advantage and selectivity are two 
separate conditions, and thus they require two separate analyses. Second, the 
arm’s length principle is not ‘well equipped’ to assess whether the measure 
is selective, but only to assess the economic advantage (Joris and De Cock, 
2017; Lovdhal Gormsen, 2016).
These arguments are not fully convincing. The use of ‘selective advantage’ 
in Commission practice is not a novelty and it traces back to its 1998 Direct 
Business Taxation Notice46 (Arena, 2017b); there is also a trend in the case-law 
of the CJEU to treat these two criteria together (Joris and De Cock, 2017). 
Moreover, since APAs are usually individual aids, the issue of the conflated 
analysis of the two requirements is not relevant (Arena, 2017a; Douma and 
Kardachaki, 2016; Iliopoulos, 2017) since the presumption of selectivity, 
deriving from the assessment of the economic advantage, is in line with the 
CJEU case-law.47 Therefore, the Commission seems to follow the way paved 
by the CJEU, without adding any further elements or widening its scope.
Major concerns derived also from another core aspect of the selectivity test: 
the identification of the reference framework. Indeed, this is a crucial element 
for the aforementioned three-steps analysis, because it is the benchmark 
44 Ibidem, para. 59.
45 Ibidem, para. 60.
46 European Commission, Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to 
measures relating to direct business taxation, OJ C 384, 10.12.98, p. 3–9.
47 Ibidem, para. 60.
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against which the measure is compared to and, hence, it can strongly affect the 
outcome of the analysis. At first, it should be noted that APAs are theoretically 
possible for every group of companies, whilst non-integrated companies are 
excluded since they are not part of a group and therefore, by definition, they 
are not involved in transfer pricing issues. In recent Commission practice 
related to APAs, general corporate income tax was identified as the reference 
framework. However, identifying such a benchmark seems rather theoretical 
and illogical. Since corporate groups and non-integrated companies are clearly 
in a different legal and factual situation in relation to transfer pricing (the 
latter by definition do not need to face this issue), it would have been more 
reasonable to identify the reference framework in corporate tax rules applied 
to corporate groups, that is, in specific transfer pricing rules (Giraud and Petit, 
2017; Verschuur and Stroung, 2017). Indeed, this narrower framework enabled 
some multinational companies to benefit from more lenient treatment in the 
evaluation of their transfer pricing as compared to other corporate groups 
that were in a similar legal and factual situation. This legal threshold would 
have been harder for the Commission to meet, but it would have led to the 
same result by following a line of reasoning that is more logical, concrete and 
coherent with State aid rules (Giraud and Petit, 2017).
V. Conclusions
The requirement of selectivity, as applied in the domain of State aid law 
and in relation to tax measures, is a complex notion. Indeed, assessing whether 
a tax benefit (that is, derogation from the normal tax system) can be seen 
as an expression of a Member State’s discretional power on fiscal policies, 
or if it falls within the scope of the application of Article 107(1) TFEU, is 
controversial. The definition of selectivity in fiscal aid involves politically 
sensitive issues, such as the allocation of powers between Member States and 
the EU in matters concerning direct taxation.
The analysis suggests that the extension of the notion of selectivity is 
a common trend shared by the CJEU and the Commission – as noted above, 
both tend to broaden the notion of selectivity. Indeed, on the one hand, the 
Court of Justice rejected the attempt of the General Court to limit the notion 
and, on the other hand, the Commission identified a broad benchmark as 
a reference framework, blurring the lines between selectivity and the existence 
of an advantage. Since selectivity is the most relevant criterion to be assessed 
in tax measures, an extensive interpretation will inevitably result in a limitation 
of national fiscal sovereignty in direct taxation by modifying the division of 
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powers between the EU and its Member States, while it is settled-case-law 
that direct taxation (which clearly includes corporate taxation) falls within 
the competences of Member States. In particular, Member States can design 
their corporate tax systems in a way they consider most appropriate and 
best suited to their economies (Verschuur and Stroungi, 2017; Joris and De 
Cock, 2017);48 their discretion in this field is limited by their duty to ensure 
effective application of EU law and, hence, shall be exercised consistently 
with the latter49 (Arena, 2017a; Azoulai, 2011; Iliopoulos, 2017). Limiting the 
analysis to these considerations – that are common ground among scholars 
– it does not seem that the EU is overreaching its powers within the scope of 
the application of Article 107(1) TFUE. However, there are some issues that 
cast some doubts upon the validity of such a strong interference of the EU 
into the tax sovereignty of its Member States.
The first concern that arises is whether there is a limit to the stretching 
of the notion of selectivity. Indeed, if there are no limits to the extension 
of this notion, the Commission would play the role of a ‘supra-national tax 
authority’, as the US Treasury claimed.50 That would add further uncertainty, 
since undertakings will not be able to rely on national measures fearing 
a subsequent intervention by the Commission. Moreover, in tax ruling cases, 
the Commission relied on a notion – the arm’s length principle – that is not 
univocal. A clarification of the notion of the arm’s length principle, as adopted 
by the Commission, would be necessary in order to increase predictability; 
a  specification of the legal basis on which this soft law concept is turned 
into hard law would also be necessary. Indeed, the reference made to the 
Forum 187 judgment does not resolve the doubts arising from such a use of 
the arm’s length principle.
Secondly, over the years we have witnessed a convergent evolution, on 
one side, of the international soft law concept of harmful tax competition 
between Member States and, on the other side, of the notion of fiscal aid 
for the purpose of State aid control meant to fight unfair competition among 
undertakings (Traversa and Flamini, 2015). Nowadays State aid rules are 
openly used to tackle harmful tax competition, and its collateral phenomena 
48 European Commission and Kingdom of Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, cit., para. 97.
49 Court of Justice, Judgment of 19 June 2014, Joined Cases C-53/13 and C-80/13, Strojírny 
Prostějov, a.s. and ACO Industries Tábor s.r.o. v Odvolací finanční ředitelství, para 23 and Court of 
Justice, Judgment of 3 October 2006, Case C-290/04, FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH 
v Finanzamt Hamburg-Eimsbüttel, para 30.
50 U.S Department of the Treasury, White Paper of 24 August 2016 ‘The European 
Commission’s Recent State Aid Investigation of Transfer Pricing Rulings’, available at: https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/White-Paper-State-Aid.pdf 
(last accessed: 14 April 2018), p. 9.
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such as fiscal dumping, aggressive tax planning and international tax evasion 
and avoidance, but this specific aim has already been clear since 1998 when 
the Commission Notice on Direct Business Taxation51 was adopted (Jeager, 
2017). State aid rules, although being a useful instrument to fight harmful 
tax competition, cannot (and should not) be used as a full substitute for the 
positive approximation of the corporate tax systems of EU Member States 
(Traversa and Flamini, 2015). Indeed, Commission decision-making practice 
seems to pursue the approximation of national corporate tax laws, even though 
it would be necessary to follow the procedure provided by Article 115 TFEU.52 
The efforts of the EU in this field (that is, coordination of corporate tax 
systems) are clear, as demonstrated by the number of instruments proposed 
or adopted in this regard53 (Cachia, 2017).
The impression is that these decisions, at least to some extent, pursue 
a political aim with a risk of a ‘backdoor’ tax harmonization (Stuart, 2016). All 
tax-ruling decisions are now under the scrutiny of the General Court, but the 
formulation of reliable predictions about their outcome would be extremely 
difficult. Nevertheless, it is certainty desirable for the CJEU to provide 
a clear and solid position towards the various issues previously pointed out, 
such as in relation to the identification of the correct reference framework, 
the assessment of the ‘selective advantage’, and the use of the arm’s length 
principle. Irrespective of the approach that the CJEU will choose to follow, its 
judgments will be a strong indicator of the actual allocation of powers between 
Member State and the EU in the area of direct taxation.
51 Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct 
business taxation, cit.
52 Article 115 TFEU provides that: ‘Without prejudice to Article 114, the Council shall, 
acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the 
approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as 
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market.’
53 See, for example: European Commission, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in 
the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, 17 June 2015, COM(2015) 302 final; Council 
Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system 
of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States, 25.7.2014, OJ L 219, p. 40–41; Council Directive (EU) 2015/121 of 27 January 2015 
amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of 
parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, 28.01.2015, OJ L 21, p. 1–3; 
Tax Transparency Package, 18 March 2015, see https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/
company-tax/tax-transparency-package_en (last accessed 14 April 2018); European Commission, 
Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly 
affect the functioning of the internal market, 28.01.2016, COM(2016) 26 final.
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